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Abstract
Airdrops are a popular method of distributing cryptocurrencies and to-
kens. While often considered risk-free from the point of view of recipients,
their impact on privacy is easily overlooked. We examine the Clam airdrop
of 2014, a forerunner to many of today’s airdrops, that distributed a new
cryptocurrency to every address with a non-dust balance on the Bitcoin,
Litecoin and Dogecoin blockchains. Specifically, we use address clustering
to try to construct the one-to-many mappings from entities to addresses
on the blockchains, individually and in combination. We show that the
sharing of addresses between the blockchains is a privacy risk. We identify
instances where an entity has disclosed information about their address
ownership on the Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dogecoin blockchains, exclusively
via their activity on the Clam blockchain.
1 Introduction
An airdrop is a free distribution of a cryptocurrency or token. It generally
involves a large number of recipients and uses external systems, for example,
existing blockchains or centralised identity providers, to prevent Sybil attacks.
In practice, the parameters of an airdrop are arbitrarily set by the distributor.
Airdrops are often considered risk-free since the recipients do not part with
anything of value. However, this is not true in the general case. For example,
one method of preventing Sybil attacks uses addresses on existing blockchains
to select the recipients. In order to claim the free cryptocurrency or tokens, a
recipient must reuse his or her existing private-keys to create a transaction on
the blockchain belonging to the airdrop. The contents of this transaction, in
particular the reuse of addresses across blockchains, its relationship with other
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transactions, and the very act of broadcasting the transaction itself may inad-
vertently disclose information about the recipients to interested third parties.
This paper considers the impact of the Clam airdrop on privacy across three
blockchains: Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dogecoin. We use address clustering to
try to construct the one-to-many mappings from entities to addresses on the
blockchains, individually and in combination. An address clustering partitions
the set of addresses observed on a blockchain into maximal subsets of addresses
that are controlled by the same entity. Each component of the partition is an
address cluster. When combined with address tagging, that is, associating real-
world identities with addresses, and graph analysis, it is an effective means of
analysing and deanonymising blockchain activity at both the micro- and macro-
levels, see, e.g., [1, 5, 10,12,16,18,20].
Experimental analysis has shown that a single heuristic for address cluster-
ing, the multi-input heuristic, can identify more than 69% of the addresses in
the wallets stored by lightweight clients [14]. This heuristic assumes that the
addresses referenced in transaction outputs spent in a single multi-input trans-
action are controlled by the same entity [13]. Although vulnerable to techniques
such as CoinJoin [11] and its kin, it is a useful heuristic in practice [7]. The
analyses in this paper use the multi-input heuristic exclusively but can be ex-
tended to any number of other heuristics, including those that reduce the rate
of false positives [6].
We examine the impact of the address clustering for the Clam blockchain on
the address clusterings for the Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dogecoin blockchains. In
other words, we identify cases where an entity has disclosed information about
their address ownership on the Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dogecoin blockchains, ex-
clusively via their activity on the Clam blockchain.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we briefly list related work
in the areas of cross-blockchain analysis, and airdrops. In Section 3 we describe
the four blockchains and quantify the sharing of addresses between them. We
analyse the address cluster sizes and coverage and we quantify the levels of
address reuse and address cluster merging. Section 4 explores the impact of
the address clustering for the Clam blockchain on its counterparts individually.
Section 5 generalises the approach to handle many blockchains in combination.
We conclude with some future work in Section 6.
2 Related Work
We can categorise related work into two areas: cross-blockchain analysis and
airdrops.
In the first category, Nieves [15] evaluated heuristics for recognising cross-
blockchain transactions, in particular those facilitated by centralised services
such as ShapeShift and Changelly1. The heuristics involve the identification
of pairs of transactions from different blockchains that can be linked to known
service addresses and have similar timestamps and output values. Popuri and
1https://shapeshift.io, https://changelly.com
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Gunes [17] performed a network analysis of the address graphs derived from the
Bitcoin and Litecoin blockchains. They identify power laws in their in- and out-
degree distributions, in-out and out-in degree correlations that vary between
negative (disassortative) and neutral (non-assortative), and global clustering
coefficients that decrease with time. Kalodner et al. [9] present BlockSci, an
open-source platform for blockchain analysis that supports many blockchains
that are schematically similar to Bitcoin. In an example usage, the authors
compute a form of velocity for Bitcoin and propose it as a useful metric for
making comparisons across cryptocurrencies. There exist many comparative
studies of the market performance of cryptocurrencies. For example, ElBahrawy
et al. [4] compare 1400 cryptocurrencies by market capitalisation over a four year
period. However, these studies are only tangentially related to the underlying
blockchains.
Although airdrops are a popular method of distributing cryptocurrency, our
second category has few entries. The MIT Bitcoin Project [19] organised a
pseudo-airdrop by offering every MIT undergraduate $100 worth of bitcoin in
October 2014. The experimenters used the airdrop to examine the behaviour
of natural early adopters (NEAs) [2]. However, we are not aware of any studies
that examine the mechanisms and the wider impact of airdrops.
We use common terminology from graph theory through-out the paper.
Please refer to Diestel [3] or a similar reference for definitions.
3 The Four Blockchains
Due to their shared lineage, the Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin and Clam blockchains
are schematically similar, i.e. they have similar block headers, transaction for-
mats, etc. However, they have very different sizes. Table 1 compares the four
blockchains based on their transaction, transaction output, address, address
cluster and non-trivial address cluster counts. Non-trivial address clusters are
those that contain more than one address; trivial address clusters contain exactly
one. At the time of this analysis, the Clam blockchain is small (∼ 16 million
transaction outputs); the Litecoin and Dogecoin blockchains are medium-sized
(∼ 84 million and ∼ 117 million transaction outputs respectively); and the
Bitcoin blockchain is large (∼ 845 million transaction outputs).
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Clam is the least known of the four cryptocurrencies. Its source code is a
fork of Blackcoin, which is a fork of Novacoin, which is a fork of Peercoin, which
is a fork of Bitcoin. It derives much of its functionality from its ancestors. Clam
was announced on the 24th March 2014.2 An airdrop sent every address with a
non-dust balance on the Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dogecoin blockchains, as of block
heights 300 377, 565 693 and 218 556 respectively, 4.6 CLAM.
The impact of the airdrop on the sharing of addresses between the four
blockchains is illustrated in Fig. 1. We observe that the Bitcoin, Litecoin and
Dogecoin blockchains share a small number of addresses (see Fig. 1a). However,
there is significant sharing of addresses with the Clam blockchain (see Fig. 1b).
For example, of the 3 775 072 addresses on the Clam blockchain, only 566 642
are not shared with any of the other three blockchains.
3.1 Address Cluster Size and Coverage
The address cluster sizes and coverage for each blockchain are visualised in
Figs. 6a to 6d. The address cluster sizes are binned in the histograms. Both
the horizontal and the vertical axes are log-scaled. The inset pie charts show
the coverage, or total number of addresses in the address clusters, in each size
range. The address clustering for the Clam blockchain differs from the others:
90% of it addresses are in trivial address clusters. This is primarily due to
the airdrop; many of the addresses appear in a single transaction output that
was assigned 4.6 CLAM. If we ignore this difference, then we can observe the
significant coverage provided by the large address clusters: 30% of the addresses
in the Bitcoin blockchain are in address clusters of size greater than 100; the
comparable numbers for Litecoin and Dogecoin are 28% and 25%, respectively.
These are significant when tagging address clusters with real-world identities:
the large address clusters provide good coverage.
The largest address cluster on the Bitcoin blockchain is an anomaly: it
originally belonged to the Mt. Gox exchange that, for a time, allowed users to
import private-keys directly from their wallets. This feature causes the multi-
input heuristic to produce false positives and requires additional heuristics and
information not available on the blockchain in order to correct for it. For the
purposes of this analysis we will ignore the impact of this false positive.
3.2 Address & Address Cluster Novelties
The levels of address novelty and address cluster novelty for each blockchain
are plotted in Figs. 7a to 7d. We define the address novelty of a transaction
to be its number of new addresses divided by its number of transaction out-
puts. A new address is one that has not yet been observed in that transaction’s
blockchain. Nakamoto [13] advised that “a new key pair should be used for each
transaction.” This is from the perspective of the payees only; if the payer re-
quires additional transaction outputs, say, for change, they should also generate
2https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=623147.0
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Bitcoin
389 713 611
Litecoin
28 655 718
Dogecoin
30 563 146
2139
537136 209
2782
(a) The number of addresses on the Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dogecoin blockchains and
how they are shared. For example, 36 209 addresses are shared between the Bitcoin
and Litecoin blockchains but are not on the Dogecoin blockchain. This Venn diagram
does not consider the Clam blockchain.
Bitcoin
2 194 940
Litecoin
409 928
Dogecoin
603 090
Clam
566 642
29
49382
12
(b) The number of addresses on the Clam blockchain and how they are shared with
the Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Dogecoin blockchains. In this instance, the universe (the
rounded rectangle) is the set of addresses on the Clam blockchain.
Figure 1: The sharing of addresses between the Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin and
Clam blockchains.
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a new key pair. For transaction outputs that contain P2PK and P2PKH scripts,
the number of transaction outputs in a transaction is the potential number of
new addresses. It can be adjusted for OP RETURN scripts, multi-signature scripts
and P2SH scripts where the redemption script is known. If everyone followed
Nakamoto’s advice, the address novelty for every transaction would be 1. How-
ever, due to address reuse, this is not the case.
We plot the address novelties for each blockchain using a simple moving
average (SMA) that includes the last 1% of transactions (blue lines). To ad-
just for the variable rate of transactions across the blockchains, we place the
ordinal transaction number, rather than time, along the horizontal axis. This
compresses periods of low-activity and expands periods of high-activity. We
observe that the address novelty in the Dogecoin blockchain (Fig. 7c) is much
lower than that in the Bitcoin blockchain (Fig. 7a). The Clam blockchain has
a high address novelty during the airdrop but low values elsewhere (Fig. 7d). If
addresses are shared between blockchains then the low address novelties for the
Dogecoin and Clam blockchains may be weak links.
Similarly, we define the address cluster novelty of a transaction whose trans-
action inputs reference at least two different addresses to be a Boolean value
that is one if the transaction merges two or more trivial address clusters, and
zero otherwise. The metric is only defined for transactions whose transaction
inputs reference at least two different addresses since only those transactions
can result in the merging of address clusters. It assigns a value of one to the
transactions that merge two or more trivial address clusters since these may be
avoidable: the payer may need to combine several transaction output values.
However, any other instance of merging could have been avoided by generating
new key pairs. Even in the presence of low address novelties, merge avoidance [8]
can produce high address cluster novelties.
We plot the address cluster novelties for each blockchain using an SMA
that includes the last 1% of transactions (red lines). We again observe that
the address cluster novelties in the Dogecoin and Clam blockchains are much
lower than that in the Bitcoin blockchain. We note that even if one blockchain
maintains or increases its address and address cluster novelties on an individual
basis, it can be adversely impacted by a blockchain with lower novelties with
which it shares addresses.
4 The Impact of a Single Blockchain
Does the address clustering in the Clam blockchain provide us with additional
information that could improve the address clusterings in the other blockchains?
To answer this question, we define a graph called the co-cluster graph for a
set of blockchains: Each vertex represents an address cluster in a blockchain.
Each edge between two vertices represents the maximal set of addresses that
are shared between the two corresponding address clusters. If the two address
clusters do not share any addresses then there is no edge between the vertices.
Figure 2 illustrates a co-cluster graph for three blockchains. Blockchain A
7
Blockchain A
Blockchain B
Blockchain C
Figure 2: The co-cluster graph for Blockchains A, B and C. The six grey filled
ellipses are the vertices and represent the address clusters in each blockchain.
The four edges connect vertices whose address clusters share addresses (filled
squares with the same colour) between the blockchains.
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(the topmost dashed rectangle) contains three addresses (the blue, green and
pink filled squares): two of the addresses (blue and green) are in one address
cluster and one address (pink) is in another. The address clusters are represented
by the grey filled ellipses. Blockchain B contains four addresses: two in one
address cluster and two in another. Two of the addresses (blue and green) are
shared between Blockchains A and B. Blockchain C contains three addresses:
one in its own address cluster and two in another. Two of the addresses (red
and orange) are shared between Blockchains B and C. No addresses are shared
between Blockchains A and C.
The top-left vertex is incident with two vertices that correspond to address
clusters in the same blockchain. This is significant because it shows that two
addresses (blue and green) belong to the same address cluster in Blockchain A
but different address clusters in Blockchain B. We can therefore merge the two
address clusters in Blockchain B. In fact, it also indirectly shows that the two
address clusters in Blockchain C can also be merged. We will return to this
point at the end of the section.
We can identify additional information that the Clam address clustering
provides over a counterpart by identifying the vertices corresponding to address
clusters in the Clam blockchain that are incident with at least two vertices
corresponding to address clusters in the counterpart’s blockchain. In other
words, we wish to identify address clusters in the Clam blockchain that contain
addresses that are shared with another blockchain but are found in two or more
address clusters in that blockchain.
We constructed the co-cluster graph for the Clam and Bitcoin blockchains.
We extracted the subgraph that is the maximal induced subgraph on the set
of vertices that represent Clam address clusters with a degree of at least two,
and their neighbours that represent Bitcoin address clusters. This subgraph has
689 connected components — this number represents the number of ‘new and
improved’ address clusters in the Bitcoin address clustering that are created by
the Clam address clustering. It represents a tiny fraction of (∼ 0.0004%) of the
original number of Bitcoin address clusters.
Figure 3 is a visualisation of a portion of the extracted subgraph. The
connected components can be divided into stars and non-stars. The stars ac-
count for the vast majority of the vertices. We hypothesise that stars represent
an entity transferring their Clams in one sweeping transaction. The transac-
tion merges the addresses on the Clam blockchain into a single address cluster.
However, the same addresses on the Bitcoin blockchain belong to two or more
address clusters. The non-stars are more difficult to explain but they can be
examined on an individual basis. One possible explanation involves entities
who purchased disused private-keys in order to retrieve the corresponding Clam
balances.3
We repeated this analysis for the remaining two blockchains. The extracted
subgraph for the Litecoin blockchain has 179 connected components. This rep-
resents a very small fraction (∼ 0.0011%) of the total number of Litecoin address
3https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=2247688
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Figure 3: A visualisation of a portion of the subgraph of the co-cluster graph for
the Clam and Bitcoin blockchains containing 689 connected components. The
green and orange vertices represent address clusters on the Clam and Bitcoin
blockchains, respectively.
clusters. In the case of Litecoin, there is one large connected component that
contains most of the vertices (2223 out of the 3255 vertices). The extracted
subgraph for the Dogecoin blockchain has 1181 connected components. This
represents a small fraction (∼ 0.0060%) of the total number of Dogecoin ad-
dress clusters but it is far higher than that observed in the Bitcoin or Litecoin
blockchains.
The analysis above measures the direct impact of the Clam address clustering
on the Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dogecoin blockchains. It shows that the number of
impacted address clusters is small but they can be easily identified and examined
on an individual basis. The analysis can be repeated in the opposite direction,
measuring the impact of the Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dogecoin blockchains on the
Clam blockchain, by extracting the subgraphs in the opposite direction.
However, this method does not capture all interactions between a set of
blockchains. In Fig. 2 the address cluster represented by the top-left vertex
indirectly impacts Blockchain C’s address clustering via Blockchain B. We can
handle this by analysing A’s impact on B and then the impact of this new
address clustering on C. Alternatively, we can consider all three blockchains
simultaneously. We describe this method in the next section.
5 The Impact of Multiple Blockchains
In Section 3 we considered the impact of the Clam address clustering on each
blockchain in isolation. However, we can combine blockchains to produce a
single ordering of all of their transactions. We can use the timestamps in the
block headers to produce an ordering that is approximately temporal. If we have
access to the times at which blocks and/or transactions were first broadcast, we
can improve the temporal accuracy of the ordering, but this is not necessary for
our purposes.
We constructed two combinations: Combination I included all transactions
10
Bitcoin Address
Clustering
Litecoin Address
Clustering
Dogecoin Address
Clustering
Combination I
Address Clustering
Clam Address
Clustering
Combination II
Address Clustering
. . . improves . . .
Figure 4: A Hasse Diagram showing the improvement relation between the
address clusterings for the individual blockchains and the combinations. The
vertices represent the address clusterings and there is a directed edge from a
source to a target if the address clustering corresponding to the source is an
improvement of the address clustering corresponding to the target.
in the Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dogecoin blockchains; Combination II included
all transactions in the Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin and Clam blockchains. We
computed the sizes and coverage of the address clusters (see Figs. 6e and 6f) and
the novelties of the addresses and address clusters (see Figs. 7e and 7f) for the
combinations as before. The dominant size of the Bitcoin blockchain is evident.
The difference between the two histograms is marginal. However, the impact of
the Clam airdrop on the address novelties during the six month period following
the creation of the Clam genesis block is evident — see the grey rectangles in the
two line charts. The airdrop decreases the address novelty in Combination II
since the addresses were already observed in the other three blockchains. We
can also observe a decrease in the address cluster novelty in Combination II
that occurs shortly after a record price for Clam, as denominated in US dollars,
was set in early 2018 — see the grey circles in the two line charts. This may
indicate a renewed interest in the Clam airdrop and a resulting loss in privacy.
The address clusterings for the individual blockchains and the combinations
are related as follows. A partition P1 is an improvement of a partition P2 if
and only if every component of P2 is a subset of some component of P1 or is
disjoint with every component of P1. The address clustering for Combination I
is an improvement of each of the address clusterings for the Bitcoin, Litecoin
and Dogecoin blockchains. Similarly, the address clustering for Combination II
is an improvement of both the address clustering for Combination I and the
address clustering for the Clam blockchain. It is also an improvement of the
11
Figure 5: A histogram showing the address cluster size and coverage for the
address clusters for Combination II that are the union of two or more address
clusters for Combination I.
address clusterings for the remaining blockchains since the relation is transitive.
In fact, the relation is a partial order and be visualised using a Hasse Diagram
(see Fig. 4).
This relation provides a convenient method of measuring the impact of the
address clustering for the Clam blockchain. We can identify the address clusters
in Combination II that are the union of two or more address clusters in Combi-
nation I. These are the aggregated address clusters across the Bitcoin, Litecoin
and Dogecoin blockchains that the address clustering for the Clam blockchain
has improved or merged. We enumerated these address clusters: there are 2161
of them. Section 4 identified a total of 2049 address clusters on the individual
blockchains that were directly impacted by the Clam address clustering. This
new number includes address clusters that are directly and indirectly impacted
by the Clam address clustering as described at the end of the previous section.
Figure 5 shows the address cluster size and coverage for the 2161 address
clusters. Intuitively, this is the difference between the histograms in Figs. 6e
and 6f. The Clam address clustering impacts both small and large address
clusters. Small address clusters may correspond to individuals making their
claims; large address clusters may correspond to centralised services such as
12
exchanges and mining pools making their claims. For a more thorough analysis,
one would need to use address tagging to associate real-world identities with the
address clusters. It is important to note, that in both cases, the entities have
disclosed information about their address ownership on the Bitcoin, Litecoin and
Dogecoin blockchains, exclusively via their activity on the Clam blockchain.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have examined a privacy risk in using existing blockchains as a basis for
an airdrop’s distribution. Specifically, we computed address clusterings for the
four blockchains involved in the Clam airdrop: Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin and
Clam. We showed that the sharing of addresses between the blockchains leads
to instances where an entity discloses information about their address ownership
on one blockchain, exclusively via their activity on another. In the case of the
Clam airdrop, we identified ∼ 2000 such instances.
The results can help blockchain analysts gather information regarding the
beneficiaries of airdrops. The opposing camp, those seeking to hinder blockchain
analysts, can also use the results to improve coin control features that consider
the implications of using addresses that are shared across blockchains.
Our future work centres around applying this analysis to other airdrops.
These include holder airdrops similar to the airdrop discussed in this paper, e.g.
Bitcoin Private, BitCore and United Bitcoin, and forked airdrops, e.g. Bitcoin
Cash, Bitcoin Gold and Bitcoin Diamond. A fork creates an airdrop since the
entire set of addresses at the point of the fork are shared between the resulting
blockchains. A user’s activity on one side of the fork can expose information
about their address ownership on the other. We would also like to generalise
this approach to study airdrops involving Ethereum-based tokens.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 6: Histograms showing the number of address clusters in each size range
for the four blockchains and two combinations. The inset pie charts show the
coverage, or total number of addresses in the address clusters, in each size range.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 7: Line charts showing the address and address cluster novelties for the
four blockchains and two combinations.
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